Home Politics Auditor General report on WIIN flawed and inaccurate- Minister Persaud

Auditor General report on WIIN flawed and inaccurate- Minister Persaud

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A class of WIIN graduates share a photo opportunity with Minister of Human Services and Social Security, Dr. Vindhya Persaud

Please see below full statement issued by the Ministry of Human Services and Social Security:

The Ministry of Human Services and Social Security is disturbed by the numerous inaccuracies, serious flaws and significant omissions within in the Performance Audit of the Women’s Innovation and Investment Network (WIIN) Programme for the period 1st January, 2021 to 31st December, 2022 by the Audit Office of Guyana.

Since its groundbreaking launch in 2021, WIIN has revolutionized access to training for women across Guyana, offering the first-ever free hybrid model with zero entry requirements. This programme, unprecedented in its scope and impact, ensures that women in every region—regardless of background or circumstance—can gain valuable skills through the Guyana Women’s Leadership Institute. WIIN directly aligns with this Government’s unwavering commitment to accessibility and inclusivity, breaking down barriers that have long kept many women from opportunities for advancement. It stands as a bold and transformative initiative that challenges the status quo and expands opportunities for all.

During the period under review, 6,203 women were trained under the WIIN Programme (2,170 in 2021 and 4,033 in 2022), surpassing the target of 6,000 persons for that period. With an investment of $185.5 million over two years, including $64 million allocated to WIIN in 2021, the initiative focused on strategically training women in several areas which are needed in the country and aligned to diverse sectoral initiatives to drive women’s empowerment and economic independence.

Although extensive documentation and information for the said period were provided, it is disappointing that the report contains many unsubstantiated conclusions. It begs the question as to whether the report is framed negatively to diminish the tangible impact that this programme has on the lives of thousands of Guyanese women. No doubt there was, and will be room for improvement, as this is a new programme, a 3-year-old, programme, which continues to evolve and expand.

While the report acknowledges the significant progress made since WIIN’s inception, it undermines these achievements with skewed, overly negative conclusions. Instead of giving due credit to the transformative impact of this programme, the report distorts the narrative, diminishing the strides made and failing to recognize the full scope of WIIN’s success.

It is crucial to correct the inaccurate and misleading conclusions presented in this report. The Ministry hereby submits the following observations, as these flaws must be addressed to ensure a fair and accurate representation of the WIIN programme’s impact and progress.

Chapter 1: Management Structure, Resources, and Systems

 

1.     MHSSS: Inherited Challenges and Staffing Limitations

When WIIN commenced in 2021, the Audit Report failed to document the dilapidated state of GWLI at the time the new administration took over in 2020. It overlooked key issues such as the defunct kitchen and computer lab, damaged infrastructure, leaking roof, lack of staff equipment, and the fact that only one technical staff member was employed. This context is critical in highlighting the significant transformation by 2022, including ongoing staff increases to meet the programme’s needs.

Minister of Human Services and Social Security, Dr. Vindhya Persaud

The pre-existing staffing gap severely impacted the Institute’s ability to execute its mandate. During the audit period, the Ministry worked diligently to build capacity and recruit staff within the structure approved by the Public Service Ministry (PSM), while adhering to hiring limitations. Contrary to the report’s conclusions, the Ministry’s efforts to establish a structured approach to manage the Institute and its training programs were underway but necessarily aligned with the realities of recruitment timelines, resource availability, and capacity building. It is important to emphasize that this process takes time, particularly when ensuring that the right talent is recruited to meet the Institute’s long-term goals.

2.     Impact of COVID-19

The audit overlooks the significant impact of COVID-19, which disrupted recruitment, training, and operations well into 2021. These delays, directly tied to the pandemic, were not once considered in the report.

3.     Development of the Business Incubator

The Business Incubator was a new initiative developed during the audit period. While the Ministry filled the critical Head position, recruiting specialized staff takes time. The Ministry’s phased approach to staffing was underway, staffing efforts are ongoing as resources allow. Again, the report failed to consider the time needed for recruitment and capacity building to ensure the right talent is hired for long-term success.

4.     Role of the Board

The report underplays the Board’s role in providing oversight and guidance to ensure that programs were aligned to the Institute’s long-term objectives during the audit period.

5.     Operational Environment and Facilities

While the report concluded that the physical environment and facilities were adequate, this was not the case during the audit period. The report fails to consider that the photos presented were taken at the end of 2023, after significant repairs and enhancements were made, and overall upgrades done GWLI. None of these were inherited in 2020 and these occurred during and beyond the audit period and were a direct result of the Ministry’s efforts to improve the Institute’s facilities.

6.     Structured Approach and Future Plans

The report overlooks key constraints the Ministry faced and the structured plans already in place to address them. Despite inherited deficiencies and challenges, the Ministry began implementing improvements for both the Institute and the Business Incubator to ensure women are effectively reached. The report also fails to acknowledge the extensive outreach, including community-based training in rural and hinterland areas, online programmes, and off-site business clinics, all critical to expanding access for women and girls.

7.     Conclusion

In summary, it is clear that key contextual factors—such as the inherited staffing deficiencies, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the phased approach to staffing the Business Incubator, the significant role of the Board, and the improvements made to the physical facilities—were not adequately considered which makes the report flawed. The Ministry has been committed to addressing these challenges with structured plans and strategic actions already in place.

 

 

Chapter 2 – Programme Design and Implementation

 

1.     Definition of Vulnerability and Targeting

The audit report adopts an overly narrow and simplistic view of vulnerability, focusing exclusively on unemployed single-parent women. In reality, vulnerability encompasses a much wider range of groups, such as women with disabilities, survivors of domestic violence, and those from impoverished communities. By limiting its definition, the report overlooks the full scope of the Ministry’s targeted efforts. Consequently, the 16% figure presented is both misleading and incomplete, making the overall conclusion flawed and inaccurate.

Women who were part of a Women’s Investment and Innovation Network (WIIN) training (Photo: Ministry of Human Services and Social Security/ Facebook)

Furthermore, the report fails to provide any data, tools, or methodology used to arrive at this 16% figure, nor does it demonstrate that the other women reached were “not vulnerable.” Without a clear basis for this calculation, the claim lacks credibility and ignores the Ministry’s comprehensive outreach to diverse vulnerable groups.

No mention is made of the many women from hinterland and rural areas who benefitted from training for the first time in their lives. The report also disregards the fact that only those who applied for the WIIN programme were considered, despite wide advertisement and in-person outreach efforts to ensure awareness. It further fails to acknowledge that the overall number of women trained exceeded the target, with training provided both online and directly in communities, effectively bridging the access divide.

2.     Programme Participation and Barriers

While 14,663 applied, participation didn’t always go through with the training, despite extensive follow-ups. The report overlooks significant efforts like community outreach, partnerships with FBOs and NGOs, and registration drives. Phone calls, WhatsApp messages, Social Media (Facebook) and emails were the tools utilised on a daily basis to reach out to women.

Barriers such as limited access to technology, transportation, and childcare prevented many from fully participating. And while the Ministry addressed these through community training when numbers were feasible to do so, it must operate within resources which do not speak to provision of technology. Also, the Ministry of Human Services must at all times operate within annual budgetary allocations which was not considered in the report.

3.     Lack of Inquiry into Non-Participation

The audit did not investigate why those defined as vulnerable; did not participate yet concluded that the Ministry failed to reach them. Many individuals who were contacted chose not to participate for various reasons beyond the Ministry’s control, even after multiple follow-up efforts by the Ministry.

4.     COVID-19 Impact and Resource Gaps

Again, the report fails to fully account for COVID-19 restrictions in 2021, when in-person classes were unavailable. The computer lab mentioned wasn’t completed until late 2022, impacting in-person participation due to lack of access to equipment and the internet. This addition was done by the Ministry as part of the ongoing efforts to provide facilities.

5.     Ongoing Efforts

The Ministry is continuously working to remove barriers by improving access to technology, expanding outreach, and supporting women with online learning, aiming to increase participation of vulnerable women. This must be seen in context with Government of Guyana’s wider digital transformation which is continuously providing hubs and access in hinterland and remote communities but over time – thereby continuously increasing the reach of WIIN. The introduction of Coursera to WIIN, by MHSSS providing certification through stackable courses from world ranked universities from 2022 to current significantly increased the participation of women online.

Participants of the Women’s Innovation and Investment Network (WIIN) classes

MHSSS was the first Ministry to utilise Coursera to provide this training format, and this is now being utilised nationally by more ministries after Government of Guyana major sign on in 2023.

6.     Purpose of the WIIN Programme

The WIIN programme was designed to complement, not compete with, existing vocational programmes, targeting vulnerable women often missed by traditional government initiatives. This distinction was not reflected in the report.

It must be repeatedly emphasised that no women-centric training programmes existed before and NO direct opportunities existed for many of the women targeted over the reporting period.

7.     Collaboration with Stakeholders

 The report’s assertion that there was a lack of full participation from relevant government agencies and technical and vocational institutions in the course development process is blatantly false. The Ministry collaborated extensively with key stakeholders, including the Board of Industrial Training (BIT), the University of Guyana, School of the Nations, and the University of the West Indies (UWI-ROYTEC). The training during the identified period was delivered by reputable institutions such as UG’s Institute of Distance and Continuing Education (UG-IDCE), UWI-ROYTEC, and the Association of MBAs (ABMA) in the UK, ensuring that the courses met high standards.

The claim that the certificates awarded are of “no value” is based on an anecdotal reference from a single individual. This isolated opinion does not reflect the legitimacy of the certification, which was conducted through respected educational bodies. What specific circumstances led to this employer’s dismissal of the certification? Was it a technical position requiring specialized qualifications beyond what the WIIN programme offered? This baseless conclusion ignores the broader acceptance and value of these certifications.

From the outset, the Ministry engaged a wide range of stakeholders, including government agencies, international organizations like UNICEF and UN Women, private sector partners such as ExxonMobil, Nations Inc., and the Women’s Chamber of Commerce, as well as financial institutions. These partnerships were critical in executing the WIIN programme and are fully in line with the Government’s mandate.

A participant of one of the Ministry of Human Services and Social Security’s WIIN workshops (Photo taken from MHSSS Facebook page)

The Ministry finds the report’s reference to a “whole-of-government and multi-stakeholder approach” vague and unclear, particularly given the extensive, documented collaboration already in place. What is being suggested here? The Ministry’s collaborative efforts far exceeded expectations, making the report’s criticisms both unfounded and misleading.

8.     Accreditation Process

The report incorrectly identifies CTVET as an accreditation body. In reality, the Ministry has engaged the National Accreditation Council (NAC) for the accreditation process, which is lengthy and can take several years to complete. Accreditation is crucial for ensuring that courses meet national and international standards, providing formal recognition and boosting the credibility of the qualifications awarded. However, it’s important to emphasize that while the accreditation process is ongoing, the courses offered by the WIIN programme focus on practical, hands-on skills designed to produce job-ready individuals. These skills are directly applicable in the workforce, equipping participants to enter employment or start their own businesses immediately after completing the programme.

The Ministry remains committed to securing formal accreditation, but the practical value and relevance of the training provided should not be overlooked by a performance audit, as it directly contributes to the economic empowerment of women and their immediate readiness for the job market.

9.     Conclusion

The audit’s conclusion that the Ministry did not effectively design and implement the Women’s Innovation and Investment Network (WiiN) programme is fundamentally flawed. The claim that  only 16% of vulnerable women were reached is based on a narrow and inaccurate definition of vulnerability, which fails to capture the broader groups we targeted, such as women with disabilities, domestic violence survivors, and those from impoverished backgrounds. Additionally, the report overlooks our extensive outreach efforts through community engagement, partnerships with FBOs, NGOs, and registration drives. The assertion that key stakeholders were not involved is also misleading, as BIT, and other relevant bodies mentioned were integral in aligning the programme with national standards and labour market needs.

The report’s narrow definition of vulnerability and its failure to recognize the Ministry’s comprehensive efforts undermine its conclusions, rendering them inaccurate and unrepresentative of the real impact of the programme.

Chapter 3: Monitoring and Evaluation

1.     Database Management and Decision-Making

The audit correctly identified some inconsistencies in the database, including duplications and missing information. However, the leap from identifying these issues to concluding that the Institute has used inaccurate information to make decisions is unfounded. Minor data inconsistencies do not imply that decision-making was compromised. The Institute actively maintains a database for applicants, participants, and courses by year, course, and region, which provided a solid foundation for decision-making. Additionally, the Ministry has continued to refine and update its database to improve data accuracy and ensure better monitoring going forward.

2.     Follow-Up with Participants

The audit report asserts that the Institute had no system in place to follow up with graduates, and therefore it could not determine whether participants progressed economically. This conclusion does not align with our practices. While the report failed to acknowledge it, the Institute has maintained databases for participants from 2021 to 2023, including those trained through the Business Incubator. For the 2023 courses, all trained participants were tracked, and we have registration forms for 2024 to capture additional information about applicants and their needs.

Further, while a formalized follow-up system was still in development during the audit period, the Ministry has taken significant steps to stay connected with graduates. A WhatsApp group was established in partnership with one of our business collaborators to keep participants informed about job opportunities.

The Ministry also sent letters to potential employers, encouraging them to hire graduates of the programme. Contrary to the audit’s findings, these systems do exist, and while improvements are being made, they reflect our commitment to supporting participants’ post-training success.

3.     Conclusion

The audit’s conclusion that the Institute did not effectively monitor or evaluate the programme is premature. Despite some database inconsistencies, robust systems were in place for tracking participants and supporting their progress. The Ministry remains committed to strengthening these efforts for better outcomes.

OVERALL CONCLUSION

The Ministry acknowledges certain limitations in the programme and is actively addressing them. However, the audit’s conclusions are fundamentally flawed, based on incomplete and, in many cases, inaccurate information. The Ministry has been relentless in its efforts to strengthen the Women’s Innovation and Investment Network (WIIN) programme, constantly refining processes, enhancing participant support, and improving systems to ensure that vulnerable women are empowered and positioned for real economic advancement.

The audit fails to capture the full scope of the Ministry’s efforts, overlooking key improvements made to expand access, provide hands-on training, and ensure job readiness. Our commitment to addressing any gaps is unwavering, but it must be made clear that the audit’s skewed conclusions misrepresent the programme’s actual progress and impact. The Ministry continues to push forward, developing practical solutions that not only tackle identified issues but also build a stronger foundation for future growth, reaching even more women across the country. The Ministry hopes that the observations presented of the current report are taken into consideration and looks forward to a fair and balanced evaluation that reflects the true value of the WIIN programme.

 

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